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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff to collect on a
promissory note with a Counterclaim by Defendant to
obtain a refund of her down payment on the purchase of a
condominium and damages for wrongful attachment.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Court.

From a

decision and judgment granting the claim of Plaintiff and
a portion of Defendant's Counterclaim, Plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of that part of the judgment
granting Defendant return of her down payment and, that
failing, of the Court's refusal to allow offsets against
any judgment awarded to Defendant, as a matter of law, or
that failing, a new trial.
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STATEMEHT OF FACTS
Synopsis
During the middle of January, 1975, Defendant,
a single, divorced woman with minor children, visited
some condominiums owned by Plaintiff and decided to
purchase one of them.

(R. 127) .

Defendant tried to obtain

a loan in order to finance the purchase, but was turned
down by Zions Bank because her debt-income ratio was too
high.

After discussing the matter with the Real Estate

broker handling the condominium sales and with an agent
for Plaintiff, Defendant decided she still wanted to purchase
the unit and could make sufficient changes in her debtincome situation in order to qualify for financing at a
later date.

(R. 137).

On March 18, 1975, Defendant entered

in an 18 month Uniform Real Estate Contract with Plaintiff,
which enabled her to move into the unit immediately while
continuing to look for conventional financing.

After making

some positive changes in her income situation, Defendant,
at the

instance

of Plaintiff, applied a second time to

Zions Bank for financing.

This time the application was

approved by the bank, but was turned down by the mortgage
insurance company, apparently by mistake.

Because of

Defendant's impending marital plans, the bank refused to

-2-
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resubmit the application, and Defendant moved out of her
unit after negotiations with Plaintiff failed.

Plaintiff sued

for return of some money loaned to Defendant, and Defendant
counterclaimed for the return of her down payment.

The main

question before the Court is whether the Earnest Money
Agreement submitted by Defendant at the time of the second
loan application constituted a new agreement between the
parties, replacing and cancelling the Uniform Real Estate
Contract previously entered into on March 18.
Statement of Facts
The condominium unit purchased by the Defendant was
part of a small complex owned by the Plaintiff known as
Country Hills Square located at 1150 Country Hills Drive,
Ogden, Utah.

The units were being sold by the real estate

brokerage, Real Estate Exchange, and the name of the salesman
involved in the sale to the Defendant was Gary Iverson.
Mr. Iverson helped to prepare the first Earnest Money Agreement
and to explain it to the Defendant.

(R. 114).

The initial

application to Zions First National Bank was turned down,
however, for the reason that Defendant's debt-income ratio
was too high.

(R. 82, R. 111, R. 115, R. 129).

Because

Defendant appeared to be serious in her desire to purchase
the unit and because it appeared Defendant would very likely

-3-
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qualify for financing after some adjustments in her financial
situation, Plaintiff offered to sell Defendant the condominim
on an 18 month contract, thereby permitting her to move into
the unit immediately and reapply for financing at a more
favorable moment.

(R.

109, R. 115-116).

The Uniform Real Estate Contract was signed by
the Defendant and by Mr. Dennis G. Lawrence, a representative
of the Plaintiff.

The terms of the contract were that the

Defendant would pay $2,350.00 down and would make $240.00
monthly payments of interest,

taxes and maintenance until

the remaining balance was paid on or before September 1, 1976.
(P.Ex: A). Defendant read the contract over and has stated
that the terms and conditions were clear and understandable
to her.

(R. 118, R. 137-138).

Shortly after the contract

was signed, the Defendant moved into the unit after the
downpayment had been used to prepare the unit to her liking,
including the remodeling of the utility room and the installation of a 14.5 cubic foot refrigerator.

(P.Ex.B, R. 107).

After moving in, Defendant proceeded to reduce
her debt burden and increase her income.

With the assistance

of Mr. Iverson, she obtained a loan to pay off various credito
and to consolidate her obligations into one monthly payment
to the bank.

(R. 147-148, R. 117, R. 137).

-4-
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a higher paying second job, which, in addition to several
pay raises in her main job, to the income from the renters
of a house she owned and to her monthly child support and
alimony payments, decreased her debt-income ratio.
R.

(R. 118,

122, R. 138).
In late July, 1975, the Defendant was approached

by Mr. Lawrence who informed her that the low-interest
federal monies which she had previously applied for were
being withdrawn from the market on August 31.

He suggested

she apply for them again before their withdrawal.

(R. 83).

Although he had not been involved in her previous loan
application, he indicated that he had made an analysis of
her loan qualifications and was convinced that she would
now qualify.

(R. 111, R. 139).

Defendant thereupon decided

to reapply for financing through Zions Bank.

The bank indicated,

however, that it would be necessary to submit a new Earnest
Money Agreement, since the federal monies were available
only toward the purchase of new homes.

(R. 83-84).

According

to Plaintiff, the bank was aware of the previous loan application and of the March 18 contract, but had decided that the
purchase was recent enough to make it acceptable under the
circumstances.

(R. 100, R. 105).

Wishing to point out to reviewing authorities that
the Defendant was already living in the unit, but believing

-5-
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that a lease arrangement would be looked on mote favorably
than a short term contract specially designed to accommodate
conventional financing, Plaintiff and Defendant indicated in
the new commercial form Earnest Money Agreement, filled out
by Mr. Lawrence and dated July 31, 1975, that the previous
living arrangement had been a lease.

(R. 85, R. 100, P.Ex.B),

The agreement gave Defendant credit for her original down
payment of $2,250.00 by calling it an advance on lease.
(P.Ex.B).

As is customarily the case with an Earnest Money

Agreement, a provision was added that the sale would be
subject to Defendant's obtaining financing for the purchase
price, which was to have been accomplished by August 15, 1975.
No discussion was had between Plaintiff and Defendant with
regard to the Earnest Money Agreement replacing the March
18 contract, and Defendant understood that the purpose of
the new agreement was to enable the loan application
to be processed.

(R 102, R. 140).

that she understood another

pu~pose

Defendant stated in trial
of the Earnest Money

Agreement was to cross out the previous contract (R. 140),
but Mr. Lawrence testified that such was definitely not the
expressed intentions of the parties and certainly not
Plaintiff's intention.

(R. 100-102).

In order to assist

Defendant to meet closing costs, Plaintiff loaned Defendant
$1,000.00, which was to be returned if financial negotiations
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failed.

(R. 25, R. 88, R. 141, P.Ex.C).

Defendant continued

to make her usual $240.00 monthly payments.

(R. 101).

This 3econd time around, Zions Bank approved the
loan application and then submitted it to Mortgage Guarantee
Insurance Corporation for its approval.

(R. 85-86).

On

or about September 15, 1975, Zions Bank informed Mr. Lawrence
that the loan application had been denied by MGIC on the
grounds that there was not sufficient square-footage in
the unit to accommodate the number of persons living there.
(R. 86).

Upon investigation, Mr. Lawrence discovered that

a mistake in floor space had been made in the appraisal
submitted to MGIC by the bank.

(R. 86, R. 110).

Zions

Bank agreed to resubmit the loan application with the correct
square-footage.

(R. 86, R. 193).

On or about the same date, Mr. Lawrence contacted
the Defendant and explained to her what had happened.
R. 142-143).

(R.

86,

She consented to the resubmission of the loan

application, but asked if the application could be hastened,
since she was planning to marry within 10 days.
R. 143, R. 193).

(R. 87,

Thinking that perhaps the intended husband's

credit could lend support to Defendant's application,
Mr. Lawrence asked the Defendant the condition of her
intended husband's finances.
been through bankruptcy.

She indicated that he had just

(R. 87, R. 143, R. 147).

-7-
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obvious that marriage would not improve the status of
her application, Mr. Lawrence asked the Defendant if she
would be willing to postpone her marriage until a later
date.

(R. 87, R. 147).

(R. 87).

She indicated that she would not.

Mr. Lawrence then went to Zions Bank, explained

Defendant's marriage plans and asked if the bank would
be in a position to obtain loan approval prior to her marriag<
Since Defendant had applied as a single woman and since the
loan would not have actually come through until after she
would have been married according to her announced plans,
Zions Bank decided not to resubmit the application representir
Defendant as a single woman.

(R. 87, R. 193).

Defendant

testified that she also tried to obtain financing by herself
at Bank of Utah where she had her checking and savings
accounts.

(R. 148, R. 152).
Although Defendant testified in Court that she reaU

never got married (R. 144), on or about October 16, Mr.Lawrenc
stated he met in Defendant's unit with Defendant and a man
Defendant introduced as her husband to discuss Defendant's
intentions with regard to future financing.
R. 194).

(R. 90, R. 148,

The Defendant and her companion asked if certain

provisions of the March 18 contract could be changed.
They wanted unlimited time in which to find financing and
wanted portions of the monthly payments to be applied to
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principal.

R. 90-91).

Mr. Lawrence indicated that he could

not give them unlimited time in which to find financing, but
would continue to assist them in their search.
R. 90).

(R. 108 I

Mr. Lawrence offered Defendant a $1,000.00 discount

on the old contract and agreed to carry a new 18 month
contract on a principal-plus-interest basis with $271.12
monthly payments.

(R. 91-92, R. 148, D.Ex.14).

Defendant's

purported husband refused Mr. Lawrence's offer and, upon
request, refused to return the $1,000.00 loaned to Defendant
for closing costs.

(R. 92, R. 186).

On October 31, therefore,

Mr. Lawrence wrote Defendant a letter requesting she return
the $1,000.00 loaned to her, since the August application
had not been successful.

(D.Ex.13).

On or about November 26, 1975, Plaintiff received
a letter from the Defendant enclosing her payment for
November and indicating that she would make another monthly
payment upon receipt of certain checks which she had previously
sent the Plaintiff.

(P.Ex.D).

going to see an attorney.

She also indicated she was

At that time, Defendant had made

six monthly payments, paying her through the month of October.
(R. 97).

On or about December 8, 1975, Defendant moved out

of her condominium unit, taking the refrigerator with her,
and has made no further payments to the Plaintiff.
R. 185, R. 188, R. 200).

(R. 134,

On or about December 19, 1977,
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Defendant's attorney sent a letter to Plaintiff informing
Plaintiff that Defendant was rejecting and rescinding the
March 18 contract.

(R. 192).

On January 21, 1976, Plaintiff filed an action to
recover on the promissory note.

(R. 1).

Contemparaneous

therewith, Plaintiff sued out a Writ of Attachment, without
notice, against Defendant's automobile and bank accounts,
believing the Defendant to be concealing her assets.

(R. 12)

The Writ was subsequently quashed on the grounds that the
act of the Clerk of Court issuing the Writ without prior
review of a Judge violated the due process clause of the
Constitution of the United States.

(R. 209, R. 10).

Upon

trial, the Court awarded damages for wrongful attachment
and found that the July 31 Earnest Money Agreement constituted a new contract between the parties, replacing the March
18 Uniform Real Estate Contract.

The Court also ruled

that the down payment under the March contract should be
returned to Defendant, after deducting the amount of the
$1,000.00 promissory note.

(R. 29-30).

Plaintiff moved the

Court for a new trial or, in the alternative, to amend the
judgment,but Plaintiff's motion was denied.

-10-

(R. 61).
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
JULY 31, 1975 EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT
WAS A NEW CONTRACT SUPPLANTING THE
MARCH 18, 1975 UNIFORM REAL ESTATE
CONTRACT.
The law generally states that a final expression
of agreement, whether it is written or oral, prevails over
a prior expression if the parties so intend.

When the

parties to an agreement reduce it to writing, with the
intention that such writing be a final statement of their
agreement, the agreement is said to be integrated.

The

critical question, then, is one of the intention of the
parties.

While some older cases have held that the question

of integration is to be determined solely from the face of
the writing and that the only question for the court is
whether the writing appears to be a complete agreement,
there is little question that the appearance test is insufficient today and should be rejected by the Courts.

Murray

on Contracts, Sec. 106, 2nd Rev. Ed (1974). To follow the
appearance test would, as Murray and Corbin have indicated
in their treatises on contracts, often overlook the actual,
express intentions of the parties and create a fictitious
intention which may or may not coincide with the actual

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

intention of the parties.
2nd Rev. Ed.

(1974).

Murray on Contracts, Sec. 196,

Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence

asserts that the intention of the parties controls and that
such intention must be found in the language and conduct of
the parties as well as in the surrounding circumstances.
9 J. Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2413, 2430, 2431 (3d Ed 1940);
Murray on Contracts, Sec. 106, 2nd Rev. Ed.

(1974).

The Restatement of Contracts states that a writing
cannot, of itself, prove its own completeness and that
wide latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances
bearing on the intention of the parties.
Sec. 236, Comment b (1973).
2nd Rev. Ed.

(1974).

Restatement, 2d

Murray on Contracts, Sec. 197,

When the principal purpose of the

parties is ascertained, after reviewing all available
evidence, further interpretation of an agreement is guided
by such purpose.
Ed.

Murray on Contracts, Sec. 114, 2nd Rev.

(1974); Restatement 2nd Sec. 228(1)

(1973).

The Utah Courts have generally followed the course
of interpretation outlined above.

In the case

of Bullfrog

Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P. 2d (1972), the Court on Page 27(
stated that when parties have reduced to writing what appears
to be a complete and certain agreement, it will be conclusive!
presumed, in the absence of fraud, that the writing contains
the whole of the agreement between the parties.

-12-
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hand, the Court indicated that such principle was only
correct when applied to an integrated contract.

In order

to determine the issue of integration, extrinsic evidence
was admissible to show the circumstances under which the
agreement was made and the underlying purpose for which
the instrument was executed.

The Court went on to state that

when considering such extrinsic evidence, the interpretation
given by the parties, themselves, as shown by their acts
would be adopted by the Court.

The Court reasoned that

such actions would be persuasive evidence of what the true
intentions of the parties were, even if such actions were
quite different from the contract itself, and would, also,
constitute the necessary ambiguity to permit examination of
extrinsic evidence of intent.

The Bullfrog Marina ruling

and reasoning was strongly supported by the 1975 Utah case
of zeese v. Estate of Seigel, 534 P. 2d. 85 and also by the
case of Bullough v. Sims, 400 P. 2d. 20, 16 u.2d. 304 (1965).
In the present case, it seems obvious to Plaintiff
that the parties never intended that the July Earnest Money
Agreement abrogate the March contract.

First of all, at

the time of the signing of the July Earnest Money Agreement
no discussion whatsoever took place about the March contract.
Mr. Lawrence explained to Defendant the purpose of the

-13-
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agreement, which was to enable the loan to be processed,
and Defendant signed it.
No discussion about replacing the March contract
occurred after the signing, either.

In fact, the first

mention of such a possibility appeared in Defendant's
Answer and Counterclaim, dated February 17, 1976, even though
Defendant's attorney had previously sent Plaintiff a letter
announcing and explaining Defendant's intention to rescind
on December 19, 1975.

Had Defendant already considered the

contract to have been replaced, why didn't she mention the
replacement issue until February?

Since the defense of

c/1~f1ncf

rescision is

d-M;.t~from

the claim that a contract has been

replaced, why did Defendant announce in December, through
her attorney, that she was rescinding the March contract?
Furthermore, Defendant continued to make her
$240.00 monthly payments, as outlined in the March contract,
through October, 1975.

She even stated in a letter to

Plaintiff dated November 28, that she would be making her
November payment shortly.

Since no mention of monthly

payments was made in the Earnest Money Agreement, she must
have been operating under some other agreement.

The only

other agreement, oral or written, between the parties was the
March contract.
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Finally, if Defendant truly believed that the
March Contract had been replaced, then why did she and her
purported husband sit down with Mr. Lawrence on or about
October 16 and discuss modifications to the contract?
Why did they not state at the time that the March contract
was no longer in effect and demand the returri of the Earnest
Money?

Instead, they discussed lengthening the period of

the contract, allowing a portion of the payments to be
allocated to principal and decreasing the amount of the
monthly payments.
Money Agreement.

No mention was made of the Earnest
Their attempts to modify the March Contract,

therefore, had the legal effect of reaffirming the ongoing
validity of such contract.
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POINT TWO
EVEN ASSUMING THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT FRAMED
A NEW AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, SUBSEQUENT
ACTS ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT EFFECTED A
RATIFICATION OR REINSTATEMENT OF THE MARCH
CONTRACT.
Ratification is based upon the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
549 P.2d 519 (Or. 1976).

Michel v. ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Accordingly, one would be

considered to have ratified a contract if he continued to per·
form under its provisions, even though he knew for one reason
or another, that he didn't have to and could avoid it.
In the present case, had it been Defendant's understanding and intent that the July Earnest Money Agreement
replaced the March contract, then she would not have had to
make any further payments under the March contract nor would
she have had to be further involved with the Contract in the
case that financing didn't come through.

She could have

immediately requested return of the Earnest
payment and moved out of the unit.

Money-do~m

Instead, Defendant con-

tinued making her usual monthly payments under the March
contract and, upon denial of the loan application, met with
Plaintiff to discuss modification to the Contract so that she
could continue her purchase.

In so doing, Defendant waived

whatever rights she had to avoid the March contract and, in
effect, ratified it.
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Even if the parties had initially intended that the
Earnest Money Agreement integrate their intentions, they, in
effect, mutually abandoned the agreement by offering and
receiving monthly payments under the former contract, by
sitting down to negotiate a modification of terms of the former contract and by Defendant's later delcaring her intention·
to rescind the Contract.

Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d

368, 423 P.2d 491 11967).
As did the Plaintiff in the Utah case of Dayton v.
Gibbons & Reed Company, Defendant, in effect, adopted the
March contract by continuing in the performance thereof,
even though she could have, by law, avoided it.

Dayton v.

Gibbons & Reed Company, 12 Utah 2d 296, 365 P.2d 801 (1961).
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POINT THREE
EVEN IF THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT
REPLACED THE CONTRACT, DEFENDANT WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO RETURN OF THE EARNEST
MONEY.
The Earnest Money Agreement, once signed by the
parties, obligated them to the performance of certain
duties; Plaintiff to have the home ready and title
clear for transfer and Defendant to secure proper financing.
Although not expressly stated within the Agreement, Defendant
had a duty to attempt the acquisition of financing in GOOD
FAITH.

This implied good faith endeavor on a purchaser's

part goes to the very crux of an Earnest Money Agreement, and
absent it, there is at best an illusory contract which binds
no party.
The record clearly indicates that Zion's Bank
stood ready to approve the necessary financing until the
statement by Defendant that she intended to enter the holy
state of matrimony in a scant half-score days.
Testimony by Defendant at trial declared that she
had not in fact married.

The Defendant's male companion was,

however, subsequent to the notification of intended marriage,
introduced to Plaintiff as her spouse.

Did Defendant use

her supposed marriage as a means of insuring the defeat of
her loan application?

If Defendant's actions were calculated
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to prevent financing and avoid the contract, then her
financing attempts were not made in good faith.
ramifications of this situation are numerous.

The
A bad faith

effort by Defendant does not release her from the Earnest
Money Agreement and she is still bound by the Agreement and
liable for the whole purchase price.

At the very least,

Defendant is not entitled to a return of the $2,250.00
paid as Earnest Money.
Admittedly, Earnest Money generally is and should be,
refunded when the purchase fails.

However, there are exceptions:

"
bad faith by the purchaser or some
act intended to cause a refusal to approve
the requested loan."
Wineman v. Guilmett, 60 Wash 2d 831, 367 P.2d 534, 535 (1962);
also:
"A purchaser who has made a deposit ordinarily
is entitled to recover Earnest Money still
in the possession of the broker, if the
sale has failed through no fault of such
purchaser .
. but he is not entitled
to recover where his own fault prevents
the sale."
Medak v. DePrez, 236 Or. 31, 386 P.2d 805, 807 (1963).
Defendant's declaration of marriage intent was the
sole cause for the failure of the loan application.

If it was

made in bad faith, or if her actions were unreasonable under
the circumstances, she alone should bear the resulting burden.

-19-
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POINT FOUR
EVEN WERE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO A REFUND
OF THE EARNEST MONEY, PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE
ALLOWED OFFSETS AGAINST IT.
The evidence has established that Plaintiff
prepared the condominium in question for Defendant's
occupation thereof.

To this end, the utility room was

remodeled,arefrigerator was secured, and other necessary
improvements were furnished.

The sums expended by Plaintiff

in preparation of the unit for Defendant were $1,823.55.
Defendant also owed Plaintiff $1,000 on a promissor
note which the Court found to be due and owing the Plaintiff.
Under the March 18, 1975 Uniform Real Estate
Contract, Defendant was to make monthly payments in the
amount of $240.00 each, starting May 1, 1975.

At the time

of Defendant's moving out of Unit #308 on or about December
1975, without notice to Plaintiff, Defendant was in arrears
as to rent in the amount of $304.00 plus $120.00 for failure
to give two weeks notice of intent to vacate.
Even if the rental arrangement were not binding as
to the amount due, nevertheless, a "reasonable rental" would
be chargeable.
"
• the purchaser upon his rescission of the
contract must also put the seller in the position
he was in at the time of the execution of the
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contract. Thus, the purchaser would be
chargeable with the reasonable rental
value of the land during the time he held
possession plus interest thereon. Tilbury
v. Osmundson (1960) 143 Colo. 12, 352 P.2d
102; Kunde v. O'Brian (1932) 214 Iowa 921,
243 N.W. 594; Leavitt v. Blohm (1960) 11
Utah 2d 220, 347 P.2d 190."
Williams v. Dunas, 40 Ill. App. 3d 782, 352 N.E. 2d 266,
269 (1976).
Plaintiff should be allowed to offset the $2,500.00
Earnest Money deposit with the $1,000 promissory note, the
value of the refrigerator ($247.21) taken by Defendant from
the premises, the unpaid rent $424.00, and the sums expended
by Plaintiff in preparing the condominium to suit Defendant's
needs $1,576.34.
In a case wherein the recovery of Earnest Money
was allowed a prospective purchaser (the Plaintiff of that
action), the Court stated concerning the rights of Defendant
seller:
"A second question involves defendant's right
to recover for expenditures incurred in altering
the house for the plaintiffs in anticipation
of plaintiffs' performance of the contract.
With respect to this right, ample authority
exists supporting the proposition that under
proper circumstances a vendor or lessor may
recover for work and material expended on his
own property in reliance on a void or unenforceable contract for its sale or rental. The basis
for the recovery is the prospective vendee's
request that the property be suited to his
needs. Although the vendees here received no
benefit from the expenditure and are relieved
from performance of the contract, they are not
relieved of their promise, which the law implies,
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to reimburse defendant for the expenditures
made in preparing the property for plaintiffs'
use. The benefit to defendant's property,
if any, is properly a matter in reduction
of damages . . . . In addition to the expense
of changing the house to suit the plaintiff's
tastes, defendant allowed plaintiffs nearly
four months' rent-free use of the house.
The
trial court correctly included in its
$2,000 award a reasonable rental value for
that period of time."
Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 13 U2d 343, 374 P.2d 309.
311 (1962).
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CONCLUSION
The evidence and law both support Plaintiff's
contention that the March Real Estate Contract was
never replaced by the July Earnest Money Agreement.

The

judgment in favor of Defendant should be set aside,
therefore, with direction that Plaintiff not be
required to return Defendant's down payment.

Alternatively,

assuming a finding that the Earnest Money Agreement replaced
the March contract, Plaintiff should not have to return
the down payment either because Defendant bargained
in bad faith or because there were sufficient offsets
against it.

Finally, in the alternative, the judgment

should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

L. Charles Evans
Attorney for Appellant
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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